In this article, Iidentifythree ways in whichWittgensteino pposed an idea of epistemicasymmetry betweenthe first person andthe secondor-thirdp erson. Examining the questions of 1) absence of doubt aboutm yo wn experiencea nd uncertainty about the experiences of others,2)ineffabilityofsubjective experience and 3) immediacy of my knowledge of my own experience contrastedw ithm ym erely inferentialk nowledgea bout thee xperiences of others, Is ee Wittgenstein's remarks about "inner ando uter"a samany-faceted denial of thec laim that people'sm inds arei ns omed eepw ay unknowablet oo thers. Thesec onsiderations also servet oc larify Wittgenstein's relation to behaviorism.
Wittgenstein on other minds
Wittgensteini su ndoubtedlya ni mportant philosophert oc onsider when tracing theh istoryo ft he so-called problem of other minds. There was ab oomo fw ritingso nt he topic from philosophers of the analytic traditiona fter them iddle of the 20 th century, probably largely inspiredb yW ittgenstein'sr emarkso ns olipsism andr elated matters. However, when Wittgenstein's contributiont ot he problem of other minds is explicitly assessed, the central attention is usuallygiven to rather narrowlylimited points in his writings. He is applauded fors eeingaconceptualp roblem in thep lace of the traditionally conceiveds keptical problemo fo ther minds (Avramides2 001). Sometimesh is talk of "criteria" is seen as an attempt to answer as keptico fo ther minds directly (Hyslop 1995) . Michelt er Hark (1990 Hark ( , 1991 is an exceptionb ecauseh eg ives a detailed reading of Wittgenstein's latephilosophy of mind from the viewpoint of theo ther minds problem, and Ig enerally agreew ith his account. However, Is ee Wittgensteinf ightinga gainst the idea that people'sm inds are unknowable to others in several different contexts at once.
Is uggest that Wittgenstein's late writingsa bout the theme of "innera nd outer"a re ah olistica ttempt to deny as ignificant epistemicasymmetry between first person and second-or-third person. By epistemic asymmetry Imeanthe assumption that each of us has aprivileged epistemicaccesstohis ownmind (and to his own mind only), making our first-personalk nowledge of our ownm inds better in quality, morei mmediate, or otherwises uperior to any interpersonalknowledge.
Ie xamine several contextsw hereW ittgensteinf irst identified a tendency to thinkthat ourknowledge of mentalgoings-oninother peoplei si nferior to our first-personalk nowledge,a nd then proceededt oc riticize such at endency. These contexts can be treated as variants of the problemo fo ther minds. Ia lsos uggest howW ittgenstein'sl ate writings aboutp sychology help to see his relation to behaviorismi nt he right light. Here Ih aved rawn much inspiration from terHark (1991).
Forms of epistemic asymmetry
Iwill identifythree ways in whichthere seems to be an asymmetry between as ubject's first-personalk nowledgeo fh is own minda nd hisk nowledge of them inds of others. In the main body of this paper, Iexamine Wittgenstein'sh andling of each of these topicsin turn.
First,t here is incorrigibilitya boutm yo wn experience, contrastedw ith some inevitable amount of uncertaintya bout thee xperienceso fo thers.I n feeling pain or seeing apatch of red,there is no room fordoubt or mistake in my own case. In contrast, it is always at least in principle possible that another person onlys eems to undergo ac ertain experience,while actuallyhedoes not. Iclaim thatWittgenstein did not deny this; he admitted that at least some types of statements abouto ur subjective experiencesa re incorrigible, buth ea ttributed this incorrigibilitytothe logical role of those statements as avowals, not to ap rivilegeda ccess. He pointedo ut that certainty has differents tandardsw hen we talka boutt he experiences of others, thus implying that ac omparison between first-personal andt hirdpersonalknowledgehere is misguided.
Second, there seems to be something ineffable about the fundamental qualities of private experiences.Ac haracterizationo r description of an experience cannotf ully disclose it to another person;the subjectalways knows more about his privateexperience thanh ec an communicate. Ic laim thatf or Wittgenstein, such a view was based on an unrealistic view of what the humana ctivity of "describing one'sexperiences"ismeant to accomplish,orneeds to accomplish.
Third,e ach of us knowshis own experienceimmediately,while we get to know theexperiences of othersthrough inferences based on their behavior.W heno ne has an experience, the thing itself is present for thes ubject, buti no bserving someonee lse havinga n experience, what is present for observation is ap iece of behavior which only suggests the presence of an "inner" experience. Ic laim thath ere Wittgensteino pposes thei mplication that seeing the experiences of others manifested in their bodily behaviori sa second-best thingc ompared to some other, betterw ay of being in touchwiththem.
Doubt and certainty
My exposition of Wittgenstein's treatmento ft he first form of epistemic asymmetry has two parts. First,Iexamineh is accounto f subjective experience statements and their authority. Second, I show how he characterizes our attributions of experiencetoothers andw hat he has to say about certainty and uncertaintyi nt hat context.
Authority of the firstperson
Wittgenstein repeatedly states that doubt about one's owns enseexperienceisunintelligible. Hisfavoriteexampleisthe impossibility of being wrongabout whetherone is in pain.
The truth is: it makes sense to sayabout otherpeople that they doubt whetherIam in pain; but not to say it about myself. (PI §246) [Referring back to PI §283("Couldn'tIimagine having frightful pains andturning to stone whilethey lasted?")]: SupposeIwereinerror and it was no longer pain? -B ut Ican't be in errorhere; it meansnothing to doubtwhether Iaminpain! (PI §288)
The expressions used herea re striking:i t" makes no senset os ay" thatIdoubt whether Iaminpain; it "meansnothing"todoubt my pains; "therei sn os uch thing" as my being mistaken about them (LWI I: 34-36, see also LW II:3 0-31, 92). It is notm erely the case that Inever go wronginattributing experiences to myself because I am in ab etter position to observet hose experiences than anyone else. Rather, thec laim is as tronger one: doubt is somehow "logically excluded"inthis case. My subjective experience is an area where questions about my being right or wrong about the features of my experiencea re just not relevant; they aren ever raised and they need notberaised.
Evenj ust in principle, whyi sd oubt not possible? It can be thoughtt hat forW ittgenstein, it is am attero fw hath ec alls "grammar". This means that first-personali mmunityt oe rrori sa norm upheld in ourl anguage.W ea re just notp repared to count anything as am istake in thec ontext of such first-personal statements,a nd we would consider first-personale xpressionso f doubt baffling:
[I]f anyones aid 'I do notk now if what Ih ave goti sap aino r something else', we shouldt hink something like,h ed oesn ot know whatthe Englishw ord' pain' means;a nd we shoulde xplainitt ohim.
[…]I fh en ow said,f or example: 'Oh,Iknow what "pain" means; whatIdon't know is whether this,t hatIhave now, is pain'-we should merely shake ourheads andbef orced to regard hiswords as a queer reaction whichwehavenoideawhattodowith. (PI §288) But it is clearly notanarbitrary norm, adopted just because we have decided to trust peopleo nt heset hings.W ittgenstein's private language argument givesreasontosay that when someone appliesa concept to herpresentsubjectiveexperience, thereisnow ay, even for thes ubject herself, to make ad istinction between a correct and an incorrect application of that concept in the absence of public and interpersonal criteria. Thea pplication of ac oncept like "pain" to one's subjective experience is rather likeaprimitivereaction, which is not aptlyd escribed as "recognizingo ne's sensation as one of pain", because therea re no criteria for telling thed ifference between ac orrectr ecognition and am isrecognition,o utside of what the subject feels appropriate to sayi nt hat situation. This, in effect,c ollapses thed istinction between appearance and reality in the caseo fp resent first-personale xperience.M osti mportantly, Wittgensteinr ecognizes that thei mmunity to error of my firstpersonal verbalexpressionsofpainisnot the result of my superior epistemic access to my pains, butr atheraf undamental feature of howf irst-personale xperience-talk works.S ucht alki se ssentially subjective,i nt he sense that it does not rely on namingo ne's sensations accordingt os omeo bjectively assessablec riteria. Subjective criteria, on the other hand, area no xymoronb ecause "rules" that areo nlyf ollowed privately aren ot rules( as arguedi n Wittgenstein's discussions about rule-following). This implies that whiled iscussing sense-experiences,Ican rightfullya pplyc oncepts like "pain" to my subjective experience without relyingonany kind of criteria (PI § 289).T hus, thes ituationi sa sW ittgensteins umsi t up in PI §258: [W] hatever is going to seem right to me is right. Andthatonlymeans thathere we can't talk about 'right'. This is thereason why errorisexcluded in principle in these cases: the necessary context requiredf or makingad ifference between success anderrorisnot there. Thus, thereremains the fundamental fact that first-personal statementso fo ne's experiencea re the undisputed starting point fort he language-game of talkinga bout subjective experiences (PI §290). Introducingo bjective criteria can make these statements revisable in some contexts, but they are always logicallyprimary.
Certainty anduncertainty in thethird person
Subjective experience is an area where" how things are" and "how things seem to me to be" arecollapsedtogether. That simple point guarantees that whenever ap erson givesa nh onestr eporto ft heir experience, we don't have to (and we as am attero ff actd on ot) take into accountthe possibility thatsuch ar eport might contain a mistake. Butitisessentialthat thereport must be honest.Thereisa huge familyofcaseswhere we see another person saying and doing things that suggest,f or example,b eing in pain,b ut we entertain doubt as to whethershe reallyisinpain. In those cases,wedonot suspect the person to be in error abouther pain, butwesuspect her of being insincere.A nd this threatens to introduce an unbridgeable gulfb etween my first-personal case,w here the possibility of error about my pain is peculiarly absent, andt he case of other people, where there alwayss eems to be the possibility of pain-behavior occurring without thep erson feeling pain: thep ossibilities of pretendingorplay-acting.
Theproblemisnot onlyabout the pains and other sensations of fellow human beings; it is aproblemabout awhole rangeofmental phenomena. As well as play-acteds ensations,t here are faked emotions,i nsincerely stated beliefs, hiddeni ntentionsa nd concealed desires.Regarding allthese, ourepistemic relationtothe minds of others seemst ob em arredw ith incurable uncertainty: therei sa lwayst he possibility of thea ppearanceb eingd ifferent than the reality, andw ea re nevera blet oc heck what ther eality in the other person's realm of consciousness is like. This incurable uncertainty about whether thea ppearance given by others matches ther eality of their inner experiencei si nt he strongestp ossible contrast with the utter lack of appearance-reality distinction in firstpersonale xperience. Is this notafundamental kind of asymmetry betweenknowing oneselfand knowing others?
Wittgenstein'sr eply to this problem is twofold. First, he argues thatt he incurable uncertainty has no real placei np eople'sl ives in practice; it exists merely in philosophical reflection, wherei tg ives rise to theideaofskepticism about other minds. Second,heargues that insofarasthere is somefundamental element of uncertainty in our attributions of mental states to others, this uncertainty should be vieweda sa ne ssentialp art of ourr elations to one another, and not as an epistemicshortcoming.
Theb asic point made by Wittgensteina bout pretensei st hat pretendingi sa"complicated pattern" (e.g. LW II: 55)t hath as to be learned like anyo ther sophisticateds kill. There are natural expressionso fs ensations ando there xperiencest hat are in place long before anything like thea bility to pretend makesa n appearance. ApparentlyW ittgensteini sa lso here suggesting what he probably would call a" grammatical"p oint: mastering the concept of pretense, that is, beinga blet op retend and take some displayso fb ehaviori no thersa sc ases of pretense, necessarily requiresb eing able to take some displayso fb ehaviori no thers as genuine expressions. Because pretenser equires such ac onceptmastery acquired through ac omplex interaction between human beings, the cases wherep retense is even imaginable area ctually rather limited.W en ever normally take intoa ccount the possibility that an ewborn childm ight pretend, andf or ag oodr eason: not because we known ewborn children to be honest,b ut because the prerequisites for anythingt ob ec alleda na ct of pretense( or honesty) are not fulfilled in thec aseo ft he newborn (e.g. LW II: 39-40; PIII, xi:194) .
The idea that there is somethingb locking us from ever being certain of what goes on in others is connected withaf alse philosophicali dea of "essentially inner eventst hat no onee lse, in principle, could witness andw hichIam unable to revealo r describe to another person" (Moran 2001: 91) . Thetruthisthat "in countlessc ases" (LWI I: 94)w ea re perfectly certaina bout the mental processes in someone else.Thisisclearlytruewhenever we recognizes omethinga sauniversaln aturale xpression of an experience occurring in normal circumstances.W hens eeing someoneb eing burned by af lamea nd screaming, there is just no point in thinking: "of courset here area lways twop ossible cases; one of pain-behaviorw ithp ain-experiencea nd oneo fp ainbehavior withoutp ain"( see LPE: 287).D oubting thea uthenticity of thiss ituation would not have then ormalc onsequenceso f doubt. It wouldr ather be like tryingt od oubt thatt he future is connected with the present (seePIII, xi: 190) .
So, in manyo ccasionsw ea re justifiably certain in our attributions of experiences to others. But the second part of Wittgenstein's replyt ot hese worriesi st op oint outt hatc ertainty and uncertaintyregardingthe experiencesofothers are of aspecial type, which gets misrepresented if it is contrasted with,f or example, mathematicalcertainty:
In mathematics ap articular kind of evidence thatc an be clearly presented leavesn od oubt open. That is nott he wayi ti sw hen we know that someonewas glad.
Therec an't be al ong disputei nacourt of law about whethera calculation has thiso rt hat result;b ut there certainly canb ea bout whether someone was irritated or not.
But does it follow that onecan know theone andnot knowthe other?
Morel ikely what follows is that in theo ne case onea lmosta lways knowsthe decision, in the other,one frequently doesn't. (LW II:85) Rather than saying that knowledge of otherm inds is inferior to knowledge of some other things, Wittgenstein characterizes knowledge of other minds as being of ad ifferent kind. Mathematicalc ertainty is generally achieved throughadefinite procedure that is not controversial. But there is no definite procedure for assessing people's reports ande xpressions of their sincerity; we cannotlay down anythingresemblingaproofhere. In Wittgenstein's terms, the "language-game" played by experienceascriptions is altogether different from those played by mathematical concepts; it doesn ot include ad eterminate set of rules.
Ican be as certain of someone else's sensationsasofany fact.But this does not make thep ropositions 'Hei sm uchd epressed',' 25 ×2 5= 625' and' Ia ms ixty yearso ld'i ntos imilar instruments.T he explanation suggests itself that the certaintyi so fadifferent kind. -This seemstopointtoapsychologicaldifference. But the difference is logical. […] Thek ind of certaintyi st he kind of language-game. (PII I, What is essential to the practiceo fj udging the sincerity of the experience-reports of others is that it is based on evidence that is often extremelyc omplicateda nd difficultt oc haracterize;a nd that in it nothing playst he role of conclusive evidencewhich everyone is forced to accepto np ain of irrationality. Wittgenstein briefly remarkst hat it is partlyb ased on "imponderable" (unwägbare) evidence (PII I, xi:1 94; LW II: 95)t hat includes "subtleties of glance, of gesture [and] of tone" (PI II, xi: 194) . Moreover, Imight be "quite incapable of describing thed ifference" between such subtleties that for me make the difference between agenuine and a pretended expression in theo ther (PII I, xi: 194) .I ft wo people disagree on how to assesst his subtle evidence,t here is no universally valid procedure to solvesuchdisagreements:
Iamsure, sure,thatheisnot pretending; butsome third person is not. Can Ia lwaysc onvinceh im?A nd if not is there somem istake in his reasoning or observations? (PI II, These areclearly rhetorical questions thatare meant to be answered in then egative. Anyway, Wittgenstein also remarkst hatt here is suchathing as abetter andw orse judgment about the experiences of others; knowledge of people( Menschenkenntnis)i saskillt hat can be learned. Butwhatone in this caselearns is …not atechnique; one learns correct judgments.T hereare also rules, but theydonot form asystem,and only experiencedpeoplecan apply them right.Unlikecalculating-rules.
What is most difficult herei st op ut this indefiniteness,c orrectly and unfalsified,into words. (PI II, xi: 193) Ar eport or confession of one's experience is the authoritative account of his experience to others, andw hen questions are raised about the sincerityo ft he report, these cannotb es ettledb ya ny simple andstable set of criteria. Such questions arei naway openended. Buti ti sathoroughgoingm otive in Wittgenstein's discussions thatt his should notb es een as ap hilosophically significant flaw in ourk nowledge of other minds; it is just a constitutive difference. There is no good reason to compare our knowledge of other minds unfavorably to other areas of knowledge in this respect, and in particularn ot to the subject's knowledge of her own mental states. HereW ittgenstein battles against epistemic asymmetry by nott akingm yf irst-personal accounts of my experience as the paradigmc ase of certaink nowledge, ando nt he otherh and by respecting our knowledge of the mentals tateso f others as itso wn typeo fk nowledge, with its own peculiar characteristics.
Ineffability
The second form of epistemic asymmetry concerns thet hought thati ts eems impossible to put thee ssential qualitieso fm yf irstpersonal sensations, feelings ande xperiences into words.T here appears to be something "ineffable"about subjective experience. It is af amiliar fact that sometimes, in thef aceo fh ighly unusual and novele xperiences, words fail to capture them. This is ar elevant issue in dream research, for example (Revonsuo 2010:84) .
But it canb ea rgued that it is not onlyu nusual experiences but consciouse xperiencesingeneral thath avea ni neffablee lement in them. It is onet hing to point out that, as Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature noticed (T 1.1.1.9; SBN5 ), spokenorwritten words cannot producet he taste experience of pineapple in someone whoi sn ot already familiarwithit; however, this does not mean that we could not still describe thetasteofpineappleinwords. Buti ti safurther thingt oa rguet hate vent he words we legitimately usei ns uch descriptions arenot about the intrinsic qualities of thesensationas such,b ut describe them in ar oundabout way,v ia metaphor and comparisonw ith publiclya ccessiblee ntities. David Chalmers writes:
We haven oi ndependentl anguage for describing phenomenal qualities.
[…]Althoughgreenness is adistinctsort of sensation with a rich intrinsic character,t here is very littlet hat one can say abouti t other than that it is green.I nt alking about phenomenal qualities, we generally have to specify the qualities in questioni nt erms of associatedexternal properties, or in termsofassociated causalroles.
[…] When we learn the term 'greens ensation', it is effectivelyb y ostension -we learn to applyi tt ot he sorto fe xperience caused by grass,trees and so on. (Chalmers 1996: 22) Ia ssume it to be uncontroversialt hatW ittgenstein woulda gree withC halmersa tl east in this sense: sensations or feelings cannot be ab asis fora ni ndependent language, separated from ap ublic communicativec ontext which gives experience-words their normativep roperties. Iw illn ot go into any detailw ith this,b ut rathera ssumei ta sagivent hat thisi sW ittgenstein's position: he indeed recognizes that we can name andd escribe subjective experiences only with thehelp of publiclyidentifiable objects. What he denies, Ia rgue, is that this posesa ny special problem for communicating them. Instead he recognizest he varietyo f situations in which andp urposesw ithw hichp eopled escribe their subjectivee xperiences to each other, andd eniest hat therei sa ny goal or purpose that communication abouts ubjectivee xperiences is constitutionally unable to achieve.
As Lagerspetz (2012) haso bserved, the tendencyt ot hinkt hat therei ss omei mpossibilityi np rinciple of describings ubjective experiences stems from failing to appreciate descriptions as actions in ac ommunicative context.W ittgenstein emphasizest he uses in which descriptions of experiences arep ut in human life. As shown in e.g. PI §244, Wittgensteins aw first-personal experience-talk as importantly connected withp rimitive expressions. The point that avowals sometimes aree xpressivei nn ature is enough to alleviate the problemo fi neffability of subjective experience to some extent. As Macarthur( 2010) explains,t he later Wittgenstein is opposedt ot he assumption that language, in general, always servess ome ones implyd efinable function. In the particularc ase of first-personal experience-talk,h ei so pposed to the idea that alls ucht alki si nt he business of describing some "inner"event. Rather, in many contexts whatisprimarilyatissueis not the descriptivea ccuracy of whatthe subjects ays, buti ts status as an avowal; an expressive utterance of the subject, which invites theh earerst oa ttend to her.M oran ( 2001) Some of thesec ases arec learly descriptive ones. Therei ss ucha thinga sd escribing one's subjective experience, ands uch a description can be successful or unsuccessful in communication.
Butm ost importantly,W ittgensteinp ointso ut that "[w]hat we call 'descriptions' arei nstruments forp articular uses"( PI §291, emphasis in the original; seealsoe.g. PI II,xi: 170-171). Therefore, whethera descriptioni ss uccessful or unsuccessful is dependent on the purpose for which the description was putf orward,a nd on whether it produces ad esired kind of understanding between the speaker and the hearer. It is clear that in different contexts, agood descriptiono fasubjective experiencew illa mountt od ifferent things. At ad octor's office, ad escription of one's pains serves its purposeifitmakes the necessary distinctions about thel ocationof the pain,i t's quality, intensity, frequency, duration ands oo n, enablingthe clinician to formahypothesisabout itscause. Such an account would be avery baddescriptionofasimilarpaininatragic poem, fore xample; and similarly, whatc ountsa sab rilliant poetic simile of excruciatingp ain might be completelyu seless fora doctor. Pains can be describeda sd ull, splitting, burning, sharp, stabbing, and so on.I tc an be argued that such descriptions are possible onlyb yb orrowing ourv ocabulary from thec ategory of public objects, and that such ad erived way of talkingc an never fullycommunicate the first-personal,experienced character of pain. It hinkW ittgensteinh as an implicit, if not an explicit, counterargumenttothe latterclaim.Iwill present it here following Lagerspetz (2012) .
Subjectivee xperiences seem ineffable only if we hold a confused view of what counts as as ufficient description.H ume noticed that even the best verbald escription of the taste of pineapple, for example,isunable to producethe taste-experienceof pineapple in someonew ho is not already familiar with the taste from his own experience.B ut descriptions should not even be expected to do such athing.The waytoproduceatasteexperience of pineapplei ns omeone unacquainted with it is to offer hera suitable sample of pineapple.D escriptions of tastes can serve a varietyofdifferent purposes, but straightforwardlyproducing novel taste experiences is nota mong those purposes. Ap erson can describe thet asteo fp ineapplet os omeone elses ot hat the other can guessw hethers he will like pineapple or not; descriptions of different foodstuffs canb eu sed to make as ystematic list of them with an umbero fc ategories, forp racticalp urposes; or twop eople tasting pineapplem ay comparet heir taste-descriptions to seeh ow their taste-vocabularies differ. In allthose contexts what counts as a sufficientdescription will be relative to the interests of thes peaker and hearer. It is notr easonable to expect descriptions to do the same jobt hat samplesd o, because description is an altogether different instrument. So therei sn or easont oc laim thatt he inabilityo fdescriptions to producen ovel subjective experiences in us is af law in oura bility to describee xperiences. (See Lagerspetz 2012: 291-294.) However, it is still possible to protestt hat even if it is nott he point of descriptions to reproduce the described experiencei n anotherp erson,n od escription of as ubjectivee xperience cane ver be exhaustive.T he felt qualities of experiencesl ike pains andt astes are richert han ourv ocabularyf or describing them,a nd therefore,t he subject of experiences always inevitably knows morea bout them than she can verballyo ro therwise communicate.B ut this protest might be based on ap hilosophicalp rejudice aboutw hat counts as an "exhaustive" description. In actualpractice, descriptions aresaid to be inadequate,a dequate, vivido rc omprehensivei nr elationt o the context of describing and theg oals of the personsi nvolved. A description of one'spain to adoctorisexhaustiveinsofarasitgives her allt he information she needs; an abundant pain-description, explaining all then uances of the experience, its minute-by-minute development, itsexact location and alterations in itslocation, might from the doctor's perspective be a worse pain-descriptiont han a more compacto ne,b ecauset he former will contain lots of redundant information. Descriptions are generally givenasanswers to actualo rp otential questions,a nd their adequacy can only be assessedi nl ight of the questions they arem eant to answer.( For onep articularly good illustrationo ft his, see PI §368.) It does not make anysense to talka bout an absolutely exhaustive descriptiono f one's experience, abstracted from thec ommunicative context; because it is notc leare venf or the subject herself what such a description should look like.Itisnot thecase that in principle,itis possible to give ac omplete description of as ubjective experience in the abstract sense,b ut as am atter of fact we are unablet od o that. Rather, there is nothing that would count as suchacomplete description in the abstract sense, eveni np rinciple (Lagerspetz 2012:290) .
Wittgensteinh as no reason to seea ny fatal philosophical problem aboutour abilitytodescribeour subjective experiences to each other. Butt his does notm eant hat he held this kind of communicationt ob ea lways unproblematic. On the contrary, he notes thata"human beingc an be ac ompletee nigma to another (PI II, xi:1 90). Another person may remain such an enigma even whenh e" does hisu tmost to makeh imself understood" (LW II: 28). Wittgenstein sees the breakdowns which sometimes do happen in human communication as breakdowns of understanding,t hat is, failurest or elate properlyt oo ther people. This can happen when the speaker andhearerdonot shareacontextofcommon interests, goals and motivations of action, or ab ackground of at least some relevant experiencesf amiliar to both.U nderstanding, in this case, canb es aidt oc onsist of the ability to have an exchange of questionsa nd answersw hich both parties can spontaneously developand enrich. Whenthisdoesnot happen and the discussion terminates,t here willb eaf eeling thats omething about theo ther person remained "hidden". In normal circumstances,t he basic interpersonala ttitudew hichW ittgenstein called our" attitude towards as oul" (PI II, iv: 152) will surely stillr emaini ntact. But it will be coupled withuneasiness; uncertainty about what theother is aiming at with her descriptions of here xperiences anda bout how she is usingher self-expressive words.
For Wittgenstein, failures to understand whatg oeso ni nt he minds of others aree ssentially of this type. They aren ot the result of some deep ineffability of subjective experiences,b ut of inabilities to share contexts of action( or what Wittgenstein called "forms of life")w ith others.T hisi sa lso the proper context for Wittgenstein's remark:" If al ion could talk, we couldn ot understand him" (PIIIxi: 190; LW I §190). If alion could talk,there is no reason why it wouldn ot be able to talk about itsl ion-like subjective experiences as well as humans can talk about theirs. The difficultyw ould rather be thev astd ifferenceb etween al ion'sl ife and human life, maybe vastenoughtomakeitimpossible for us to find the right questions to ask aboutl ion-like experiences, so that the lion could understand what we want to know of it.
Inference and behavior
The third andfinalform of epistemicasymmetry that Iwilldiscuss concerns ther elationb etween ourp erceptions of humanb ehavior and our beliefs about mental eventsthatare thecauses of behavior. Supposedly, ourb eliefs aboutt he mindso fo thersa re formedo n the basiso ft heir behavior. Thes ubject's own beliefs about her mental life, by contrast,a re (normally)n ot grounded in observations of her own behavior.F irst-personale xperiences are "just felt"; oura wareness of them is notg roundedi na nything furtherthan just theexperiences themselves.
When Ih aveapain, Ih aved irect access to thep ain itself, whereas in the caseo fo thersIhave direct access only to bodily movements like grimaces, gestures, soundsand speech; in short, to pieces of pain-behavioro fo thers. This view has some familiar philosophicalc onsequences. First, it seems thate veni ni deal circumstances,t he best we can do is to become assured that other people probably have pains, sensations and other experiences; although this probabilityw illb eo verwhelminglyh igh, it will not amountt oc ertainty.S econd,i tw ould be strictly wrong to say that pains, sensations ando ther experiences are ever perceived by anyone other than thesubject herself; it is only thebehaviorwhich suggests the presence of these things that is being perceived.T his can be taken to be an existentially flavored philosophical problemi ni ts ownr ight:w ec annot meet them inds of others first-hand. Above (insection3.2)Icovered Wittgenstein'streatment of thefirst point. Iw illn ot here go deeperi nto Wittgenstein'sn otiono fc ertainty in On Certainty ande lsewhere. Instead Iw illp roceed to the theme of perceiving the minds of others, linkingt his topic to Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-seeing.
Introspection,behavior and evidence
It wouldb eu nintuitivet od eny that ourevidence of mental events of others is, in ar eal sense,c onstituted by their bodilyb ehavior. What Wittgenstein is doing is subtlycriticizingthe status which we give to that behavioral evidence. Thee ssential pointo ft his criticism is briefly statedinPI §246: The questions of ourk nowledge of other minds and our knowledge of ouro wn minds are,a st er Hark (1990: 141) puts it, two sides of thes ame coin for Wittgenstein. For him, the motivation to sayt hat behavioral evidence fort he experiences of others is indirecta nd insufficient stemsf rom thef actt hat we comparei tw itht he first-personal case, where we supposedly have another, better kindofevidence. In the first-personalcase,weseem to have direct, introspective evidenceofour experiences. Wittgensteinb reaksthis asymmetry by insisting that it is wrong to construe ourrelation to (at least some types of) ourown mental states in terms of introspective evidence.I ti sn ot that Ik now of my painsa nd sensations because Ii ntrospectively seeo rf eelt he sensation or feeling;r ather, Is imply havet he pain or sensation. The relation is even more intimatet han the alleged direct introspective access. If Ik newo fm yp ains by consulting introspective evidence, then therew ould be no reason why this introspection couldn ot sometimes go wrong,r esulting in me being mistaken about my own pains, which Wittgensteinh eldt ob e nonsensical (see above,s ection 3.1).R ather, Wittgensteinw rites explicitly:
It is notasifhehad only indirect, while Ihave internaldirect evidence for my mental state. Rather,hehas evidencefor it, (but) Idonot. (LW II: 67) We onlyc onstrueb ehavioral evidence fort he mental states of othersa si ndirect evidence because we have an idea of some superior typeo fe vidence, compared to which theu sualb ehavioral evidence is as econd-best thing. But whatw eh avei nt he first person is not ag oodp oint of comparison, because theret he relation between us and ourmentalstates is not evidential (e.g. LW II:92). Further,itisnot clearifany other ideaofasuperior typeof evidencei sc oherent. In the BrownBook,W ittgensteinr emarks that "people have often talked of adirect transmission of feeling which wouldo bviate the external medium of communication" (BBB: 185), andproceeds to questionwhetheritmakes sense to postulate such ad irect medium of communication in contrast of the usual, "indirect" one. Such am edium wouldb es omething liket elepathy, or what C.D. Broad(1925:328-330) called "telegnosis":acognitive situationw here thep erceiver wouldb ei nvolveds olelyw ith a mental eventb elonging to anotherm ind. It would be at opic of a whole separate discussion to see whetherany such situationscan be coherentlyd escribed. Onec ould conjecturet hat Wittgenstein wanted to answer in the negative. Therefore, it is wrong to say that we learno ft he sensations of others only from theirb ehavior, but righttosay that we learnofthem (simply)from their behavior.Itis just the"only"which is inappropriate.
Behavior andaspect-seeing
Much of Wittgenstein'sw ritingso np erception andp sychology revolve arounda spect-seeing (see PI II,x i; LW I § §165-180, 735-785; LW II: 12-18; Z § §208-226).T here is an atural linkb etween aspect-seeingand perceivingother minds, which showsitselfwhen Wittgenstein talksa bout thep ossibilityo fs eeingo ther human beings as machines or automata:
But can'tIi magine that thep eople around me are automata, lack consciousness, even thought heyb ehave in the same waya su sual? --If Iimagine it now -aloneinmyroom -Isee peoplewith fixedlooks (asinatrance)going about theirbusiness -the idea is perhaps alittle uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this ideai nt he midst of your ordinary intercourse with others,inthe street, say! Say to yourself, for example: "Thec hildreno vert here arem erea utomata;a ll their liveliness is mere automatism." Andy ou will either find thesew ords becoming quite meaningless; or youw illp roducei ny ourselfs ome kind of uncanny feeling,orsomething of thesort.
Seeingal iving human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing onefigure as alimiting case or variantofanother,the cross-pieces of a window as aswastika, for example. (PI §420) This indicates thats eeing living humanb eings as lacking minds is seeing themunder acertain aspect. It also indicates thati tisavery unusual aspect, onethat can be summonedonly briefly andonly in favorable circumstances.W ittgenstein admitst hat at least in some sense, peoplecan be imagined to be mindless machines, butpoints outt hat such imagining never has more than trivialp sychological consequences. Ourc ertainty aboutt he minds of others is not threatened in practice; we just cannotsee people that way.
In PI II, xi,W ittgenstein explores the rangeo ft he concept of "seeing". He is interestedi nt he conceptual issues around the phenomenon of seeingapicture according to an interpretation, or underacertaina spect,i nw hichc aset he perceiveri ns ome sense "sees" things in thepicturewhich arenot strictly speaking "in" the picture.O ne of his examplesisthe following:
Isee that an animalinapicture is transfixedbyanarrow.Ithas struck it in thet hroata nd sticks out at theb acko ft he neck.L et thep icture be as ilhouette. -Do you see the arrow -or do youm erely know that theset wo bitsa re supposed to representp arto fa na rrow?( PI II,x i: 173, emphasesinthe original)
Wittgenstein then goes on to sayt hat" it must be possiblet og ive both remarks ac onceptual justification" and that theq uestion concerns thes ense in which this can be said to be ac ase of seeing (PIII, Wittgensteino ften discusses seeingf eelings and emotions manifested in ah uman face, and these discussions aree ntangled with discussions of aspect-seeing, clearly indicating ac onnection (Luckhardt 1983: 333) . Equally clearly he construes the cases of feelings ande motions in others as cases of seeing. In Zettel he makest hisv ery explicit (Z § §220-226).When seeing an aspecti na picture,w es ee both the picturea nd thea spect,b ut we do not see them as two separate things. Similarly with seeinga ne xpressive human face:
What do psychologistsr ecord? --What do they observe? Isn't it the behaviour of human beings,inparticular theirutterances? But these are not about behaviour. The point is that there is ac onceptual distinction to be made betweent he sensei nw hich we see thep hysicalf eatureso faf ace andt he sense in which we see af eeling manifested in them; but both arecasesofseeing.The latter is notinferredfrom the former (Z §225). Ratheri ti sd isplayed in thef ormer, leadingW ittgenstein to saythat "the human bodyisthe best picture of the humansoul" (PI II,iv: 152).
Of course,p arto ft he interest of the phenomenon of aspectseeing is thep ossibility of aspect-blindness.I tc an happen, fora varietyo fr easons,t hat someone is unablet os ee af eeling manifested in theb ehavior of theo ther person. Here,a sm uch as with thetheme of ineffability, it shouldbenoted that Wittgenstein is notc laiming interpersonalr elations to be always epistemically unproblematic. What he doesc laim is that the minds of others are noti na ny peculiarw ay inaccessible to us.Im ight not always be able to see thef eeling manifested in thef acial expression of the other person; but whenIdo see it, Iliterally see it in theface, ratherthan somewhere behindit.
Concluding remarks: Wittgenstein and behaviorism
Wittgenstein's wayo fs tudyingm ental phenomena quite fundamentallyinvolves the thought that thereisnoprivilegedfirstperson perspectivet hat is helpful in understanding what mental phenomena are( e.g. RPP II § §31-35, 531; PI §314, 413;P II I, xi: 174). To that extent, hisa pproach hasamethodologically behaviorist tone.B ut logicalb ehaviorism is in no waya ttributable to him; hisexpressive analysis of first-personalexperience-talk rules thato ut,a sL uckhardt( 1983), Fogelin (1976: 174-176 )a nd others have observed. In his (1991),t er Hark offers ar eading which showsh ow Wittgenstein's "attitude towards as oul" and his remarksa bout theo pen-ended nature of experience-attributions to others( see 3.2 above) also preclude hisa ccounto ft hird-personal experience-talk fromb eing interpreteda sl ogically behavioristic. Anyway, there is stillas ense of ambivalencei nW ittgenstein's relationtobehaviorism. Ithink his essentialcritique of it can be put in terms of inner and outer: Wittgenstein is opposedt o behaviorism insofara si tc onstruest he behaviorw eo bservei n others as "outer" events, whichforces onetodenythe existence of the things we usuallycall "inner"processes (see PI §308).
WhatW ittgenstein implies is thatt he behaviorist is right to insist on thep ublicity ando bservabilityo fmental phenomena, but thatt he notion of "behavior" which underlies or is suggested by behaviorismi sm isguided.I ti sa ni mpoverished concept of "mere behavior" (see LPE: 278-279). Thebodily movements of others are not mere behaviortous, comparable to the "behavior" of gases or planets,b ecause thef ormerh aveauniquelyh uman aspectf or us. They arej oy-behaviors, pain-behaviorsa nd sorrow-behaviors, and we know what joys,pains and sorrows arebyliving as members of acommunity where such things occur.
Introspectionist psychology attemptst os tudyt he "inner" eventso fh umanc onsciousness, which arer eachableb y introspection and then reported through speech or some other medium; butinany casethrough some "outer" event. Wittgenstein is opposed to this dichotomy. Buth ei sa lso opposed to behaviorismi nsofara si tr emains trapped in thisd ichotomya nd only denounces onehalf of it,claimingthat those which are usually called" inner" events arei nr eality nothing but "outer" events( PI § §304-314;L PE:2 78-284). Ther ight thing to do is to see the talk of "inner" experiences andtheir "outer"manifestationsastools for making conceptuald istinctions in thec ontinuous fabric of human life. That fabric is whole and open to view as it is,and most of the timeitdoesnot invite the quite specialized distinction of inner and outer.
